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ABSTRACT
The study focuses on the challenges of the ageing population in Finnish public 
policies related to municipal structures and finances. First, we review how the 
impacts of the ageing population have been identified and how necessary policy 
responses and reforms of the municipal division in particular have been priori-
tised by recent central governments. Second, we evaluate how state grant policy 
has equalised the financial capabilities ofmunicipalities to cope with the financial 
consequences of the ageing population. Our findings indicate that ageing is 
believed to increase municipal expenditures because the demand for care ser-
vices in particular is growing. The analysis also demonstrates that the state grant 
system is capable of substantially equalising the differences in tax bases and 
spending obligations between municipalities. Nevertheless, central governments 
have planned ‘big-bang reform proposals’, introducing a completely new tier of 
democratic government and regionalising the most burdensome welfare services 
of municipalities.
KEYWORDS Ageing population; municipal division; municipal mergers; inter-municipal collaboration; 
fiscal equalisation; state grants
Introduction
Finland is one of the most rapidly ageing societies among OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries and, 
according to Pirhonen et al. (2020), it is the fastest-ageing society in Europe. 
In 2000, 14.8% of the Finnish population was 65 and over, but in 2019, the 
share was 21.8%. The overall national statistics also show that the birth rate in 
Finland has declined worryingly, especially in recent years. Furthermore, 
urbanisation has made many outlying districts nearly empty, but the more 
recent migratory trend is that people are relocating from small and mid-sized 
cities to around ten growth centres.
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Finland is an interesting case in local government studies. 
Municipalities hold a wide self-government while having the extensive 
delivery and funding responsibilities of centrally regulated public welfare 
services, including basic education, social services and health care. 
However, the ageing population and demographic decline are threaten-
ing the stability of this highly decentralised and municipalised welfare 
service system, as many municipalities have faced issues against their 
vitality and solvency.
The study focuses on the challenges of the ageing population in public 
policies related to municipal structures and finances. First, it finds out how the 
impacts of the ageing population have been identified and how necessary 
policy responses and reforms of the municipal division in particular have 
been prioritised by recent central governments. The reviews outline the 
major restructuring propositions that enable us to specify and compare the 
aspirations of the recent cabinets to adjust and radically change municipal 
structures and functions, and to summarise the realised development of 
municipal mergers and inter-municipal collaboration.
Second, the study reviews the financial health of local governments by 
comparing disposable revenues between municipalities with heavily aged 
and less-aged populations. The aim is to find out how central government 
policy towards local governments has equalised the financial capabilities of 
local governments to cope with the financial consequences of ageing.
Our analyses of government propositions to parliament show that, as the 
central governments have become increasingly concerned about the abilities 
of many municipalities to function and maintain local welfare systems, they 
have used compulsory municipal mergers, subsidised some voluntary mergers 
and increased statutory arrangements of inter-municipal collaboration as the 
major readjustment strategies to renew municipal organisations. However, the 
current central government feels that the country needs a radical reform of 
local public finances and service systems; therefore, it proposes the creation of 
new regional governments that will take responsibility for all municipal social 
services, health services and fire and rescue services.
The statistical analyses of the study show that the state grant system has 
been reformed and fine-tuned so that the present system recognises the 
financial problems associated with the ageing population and effectively 
equalises the fiscal preconditions of all municipalities.
Analytical framework
Disputing views of the optimal structures of government
Centralised and decentralised governmental structures are the extreme ends 
of an administrative continuum where centralised public service functions are 
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considered to represent standardised and monolithic supply while munici-
palities inherently provide locally adjusted solutions. The European Charter of 
Local Self-Government mandates that public responsibilities shall generally 
be exercised, in preference, by the authorities which are closest to the citizen. 
This has been interpreted to prioritise locally decentralised political and 
administrative structures through municipalities as small as possible. The 
ultimate justification for municipalities is based on political theory arguing 
that local governments are not simply organisations of public service deliv-
ery; they must also secure public interest by facilitating representative 
democracy and enabling the participation of local residents (Bailey 1999).
Fiscal federalism looks for an optimal division of duties between different 
tiers of government and argues how taxation, inter-governmental grants, 
spending competences and regulatory powers should be allocated to 
national, regional and local governments. The normative theory of fiscal 
federalism argues how to share state and local functions according to the 
aim of promoting the efficient allocation of a nation’s resources for both 
production and consumption – ‘allocative efficiency’ (Bailey 2008). 
Municipalities have a high potential in allocative functions by responding to 
local market failures, and by default, a decentralised service structure is 
considered to support allocative efficiency by enabling the production of 
public services to match the preferences of local citizens. However, the 
disadvantages of local decentralised service systems are their limited econo-
mies of scale and difficulty in exercising strategically co-ordinated public 
policies (Bailey 1999, 2008). The criterion of revenue adequacy and fiscal 
needs states that the ability to collect taxes should match the needs for 
budgetary expenditures as perfectly as possible in order to have fit-for- 
purpose accountability mechanisms (Oates 1972).
Public choice theorists have argued that if public services are divided 
between several tiers of government, the relative costs and achievements 
of each tier become transparent, allowing residents to make separate judge-
ments and allocate their electoral support and payments of taxes accordingly. 
Having a large number of multi-purpose local authorities are considered to 
promote public interest by maintaining inter-local competition, enabling 
citizens to make choices and empowering local residents to participate in 
and learn democratic processes and take financial responsibility for collective 
decisions. These arguments are associated with the famous Tiebout model, 
assuming that a highly fragmented structure of local governments is 
a market-type condition creating competitive pressures to local policymakers 
to attract mobile families and enterprises as new taxpayers (Boyne 1997; 
Briffault 1996).
Advocates of large-scale local authorities diminish the benefits of inter- 
municipal competition as they consider that merged municipalities essen-
tially enhance the economic efficiency of public duties; this enables 
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economies of scale to be gained in service production and externalities of 
municipal actions to be internalised. Anyway, the claimed benefits are not 
undisputed since many international empirical studies have not been able to 
demonstrate cost savings or benefits of that sort as the direct impacts of 
municipal mergers (Bish 2000 ref by Dollery and Johnson 2005; Roesel 2017; 
Lüchinger and Stutzer 2002). Opponents of municipal amalgamation point 
out that mergers have adverse impacts on local democracy by weakening 
effective representation and robust citizen participation and making the 
societal engagement of local communities more complex (Dollery and 
Johnson 2005; Boyne 1997). However, an appropriate local government 
structure has remained an unsettled issue not only in political science but 
also in public sector economics (Bailey 1999).
The paradox of the decentralised Nordic countries
The Nordic countries are so-called welfare states in which constitutions define 
the basic and equal economic, social and educational rights of citizens. The 
specific and relatively abundant entitlements of citizens are indicated 
through welfare legislation, which also demonstrates the statutory service 
duties of local and regional governments (Kröger 2011).
The Nordic countries are said to be the most decentralised among the 
European countries as their municipalities provide and fund most of the 
welfare and community services (Mäkinen 2017; Reichborn-Kjennerud and 
Vabo 2016). The ultra vires doctrine is not applied, as local governments have 
general powers that also enable them to provide various voluntary services to 
local residents. Wide local self-government is a long Nordic tradition, and in 
Finland, it is strongly guaranteed by the constitution of the country (Mäkinen 
2017).
The paradox of the decentralised welfare countries is that self-government 
allows local choices and priorities, but the welfare schemes and services aim 
to provide equal benefits for all citizens. The paradox urges supervision of the 
applied decentralised public policies while creating conflict between the 
central government and regional and local governments. The decentralised 
administrative structures also need continuous stabilisation measures, but at 
the same time, they are exposed to various re-structural or rescaling aspira-
tions (Mäkinen 2017; Kröger 2011).
The position of local governments is pronounced in Finland, as it is one of 
the few EU Member Countries whose public administration is organised by 
only two tiers of democratic government: central government and the muni-
cipalities. Finnish municipalities are responsible for providing public social 
welfare, education (except university education), culture, technical infrastruc-
ture and local public utility services, and unlike in the Scandinavian countries, 
Finnish municipalities are also responsible for organising and funding public 
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health services. Due to the intense decentralisation and relatively small size of 
the municipalities (the median Finnish municipality has only approximately 
6,100 inhabitants), municipalities’ societal role is remarkable but heavy.
Municipal taxation and the financial equalisation of municipalities
The Finnish municipalities’ self-government is also guaranteed by the muni-
cipal taxation powers highlighted in Table 1. Nordic municipal taxation is 
essentially based on an income tax, which is also the main source of muni-
cipal revenues in Finland. Furthermore, municipalities have the power to tax 
property owners (i.e., of real estate), but the share of property tax revenues 
among all municipal revenues is relatively small. Municipalities do not have 
the power to tax enterprises. Instead, they receive a share of the national 
corporate tax revenues, but these tax revenue streams have been unstable 
because of responsiveness to business cycles and tax policy changes.
As the differences between municipalities’ revenues and cost factors have 
been remarkable, the revenue adequacy criterion is arranged through a state 
grant system providing grants that cover approximately 20% of the total 
municipal revenues. For a long time, earmarked specific grants to local 
authorities were bound by laws and regulations limiting local autonomy in 
practice before major reforms that transferred former earmarked grants to 
general grants took place in the 1980s and 1990s. In Finland, this reform 
happened in 1993, with the introduction of a grant system that consisted of 
equalisation schemes that levelled off differences in tax revenues and spend-
ing needs between municipalities (Oulasvirta 1997; Moisio, Loikkanen, and 
Oulasvirta 2010). There were also some other regulatory reforms, giving more 
power to local politicians to decide and allocate money according to local 
preferences. These reforms gave more leeway to realise the well-known 
potential benefits of decentralisation (Oates 1972, 2005).
Based on the spending needs criteria, each municipality has its own 
calculatory costs in the equalisation of municipal spending needs. All munici-
palities have the same financing share (€3599/inhabitant for the year 2018) of 
their calculated service costs. Formally, this is full equalisation between their 
Table 1. Municipal autonomous taxation powers.
Municipal income tax Municipal property tax
Subjects Salaries, pensions, many social 
benefits, but not incomes 
from capital
Residential and business buildings and land 
except forests and farmlands
Tax rates Municipalities have the right to 
decide the tax rate without 
limitations
Municipalities have the right to set the tax 
rates within the ranges defined for 
different property classes
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own financing shares per capita and their calculatory service costs, which vary 
between municipalities based on their spending needs. If the real costs are 
higher than the calculated costs, this part gets no equalisation. If the real 
costs are lower than the calculated costs, the municipality still gets the whole 
grant (in other words, the difference between calculatory service costs and 
their own financing share per capita). This is an incentive to economise 
service production because the efficiency benefit is not cancelled via 
a corresponding grant decrease. The problem is that the state has raised 
the municipalities’ self-financing share in recent years. If cabinets cut grants 
to low levels, then equalisation with grants will lose its force.
Revenue equalisation is operated by the Ministry of Finance, which 
equalises calculatory tax revenues that the municipality could raise if it 
used the country’s average tax rates on taxable personal incomes and prop-
erty tax bases. Revenue equalisation comprises municipal income tax, muni-
cipal property (real estate) tax, and the municipalities’ share of corporate tax 
revenues. The revenue equalisation guarantees all municipalities 80% (com-
pensation level of 80%) of the average per capita calculatory tax revenues 
(threshold of 100%) as a supplement to their block grants. Municipalities 
whose calculatory tax revenue is above the threshold must pay 37% as well as 
an additional percentage based on a logarithm of the surplus amount to the 
funding as a reduction in their block grants (Moisio, Loikkanen, and Oulasvirta 
2010; The law of state grants to municipal basic services 29.12.2009/1704).
Materials and methods
We performed document analyses by reviewing official documents of the 
state government. The documents included law-drafting materials, especially 
governmental propositions to parliament from 1992 to 2019 published in full 
text in Finlex, an online database of Finland’s Ministry of Justice. In these 
thematic reviews, we identified how the impacts and associated risks of the 
ageing society’s development had been articulated by central governments 
and what kinds of structural rescaling measures have been prioritised. We 
also compiled statistical data from municipal central associations to illustrate 
the incurring of debt and the realised structural changes of the municipal 
sector.
Then, using financial data and demographic statistics from Statistics 
Finland (2020) and the Association of Finnish Regional and Local 
Authorities, we analysed the financial positions and service costs of different 
municipalities and the relationships between their demographic character-
istics and their disposable tax and grant revenues. We divided municipalities 
into four groups according to the percentage of older people among the 
general population and calculated the averages of several variables in these 
four groups (Table 4–7). We also calculated correlations and ran regression 
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analyses (ordinary least squares, OLS) using the SPSS statistical software. In 
our first regression model, the dependent variable was the disposable tax and 
grant income per inhabitant, and in the second model, it was the surplus per 
inhabitant. The independent variables of the calculated regression models 
included mainly age and other population-based indicators, which are central 
factors associated with the financial capacity of municipalities.
Recognition of the ageing society development
According to some previous studies, the Finnish welfare state policies imple-
mented through local authorities have met with growing problems. The 
deteriorating dependency ratio, uneven migration flows and different unem-
ployment rates increasingly differentiate the service needs and abilities to 
collect local taxes between areas (Moisio, Loikkanen, and Oulasvirta 2010; 
Sjöblom 2020). The financial difficulties of local governments have increased, 
but their own means of responding to these challenges have remained 
limited, meaning that increases in tax rates and debt are the only potentially 
powerful revenue-based coping strategies (Nelson 2012; Ladner and Soguel 
2015). Figure 1 highlights that municipal debt has more than tripled within 
two decades in Finland. The OECD (2018) has also emphasised that Finnish 
public finances are under pressure from the rapidly ageing population, 
increasing public expenditures, while globalisation and high unemployment 
and low employment rates create challenges in raising revenues.
According to our document analyses, the ageing population as a societal 
trend has been a source of serious concerns for recent cabinets, as it has been 
referred to in many governmental propositions to parliament (e.g. govern-
ment bills to parliament). The development has been associated with the 
decreasing birth rate and the improving longevity of the population, while 
urbanisation and selective migration have been named as parallel phenom-
ena, making small and rural local authorities and the Eastern and Northern 
parts of the country the worst-hit areas.
Recent central governments have considered that the ageing society’s 
development increases demand for services, especially social and health 
services, accelerates the retirements of municipal workers, increases the 
demand for new municipal recruitment even though it may be difficult to 
find new workforces in service industries, increases municipal service costs 
and expenditures and causes difficulties in controlling municipal expendi-
tures. In contrast, the ageing society’s development also decreases demand 
on municipal education services. For example, in 2000, there were 4,009 
comprehensive (primary and elementary) schools, compared to 2,279 in 2019.
Central governments have articulated varied public policy measures to 
change fiscal and related policies and how public authorities are organised 
and operate. They are considered a necessary means of coping with the 
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ageing population. Creating economic growth and improving cost- 
effectiveness and productivity are often named as vital but very generic 
policy measures for responding to the development. A remarkable and gen-
eral reform directly associated with these aims was a new pension system, 
which passed parliament in 2015. The earliest eligibility age for old-age 
pension was raised from 63 to 65, and the forthcoming eligibility age for old- 
age retirement was linked to life expectancy. It's widely expected that the 
reform will extend work careers. According to the latest pension reports, 
average work careers became 3.4 years longer between 2000 and 2018 
(Finnish Centre for Pensions 2019). Our analyses of government proposals 
also revealed that more specific but reasoned coping means would be the 
diversification of public service supply, digitalisation of municipal services, 
increased use of services on wheels, home help services, itinerants, and better 
utilisation of voluntary workers.
Ageing motivates efforts to consolidate municipal structures
Central governments have persistently focused on local government struc-
tures, while some members of the political elite have, from time to time, 
claimed that the municipal division is outdated, providing low value for 
money. The governmental proposals to parliament have included explicit 
and enhanced demands to renew the municipal division, increase inter- 
municipal collaboration and create wider catchment areas of municipal ser-
vices. These reformist tendencies have accumulated into major reorganisa-
tion proposals based on the fundamental idea of consolidating and unifying 
the local government structures summarised in Table 2. These proposals are 
accompanied by an OECD (2018) survey arguing that municipal social and 
health services suffer from inefficiencies partly because the service system is 
fragmented as statutory service responsibilities are decentralised to many 
autonomous local authorities.
As Table 2 demonstrates, the central government’s plans have been succes-
sive and ambitious. The Municipal and Service Structure Reform was a fixed-term 
national reform programme between 2007 and 2011 that successfully delivered 
voluntary municipal amalgamations by providing state government merge sub-
sidies. By contrast, a couple of subsequent reform proposals have not been 
successful. The Social and Health Care Reform was the first proposal, which 
totally failed in 2015 (Valkama, Asenova, and Bailey 2016). However, the archi-
tects of the proposals considered that the potential impacts of the ageing 
population may be so serious that the municipal-based system of public welfare 
services would not be able to cope adequately. The next and even larger fiasco 
was the Regional Government, Health and Social Services Reform, which 
included a radical proposal to regionalise municipal social, health, fire, rescue 
and some other services by creating new, democratic and semi-autonomous 
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regional governments and expanding the freedom of choice of patients, includ-
ing inter alia the wider use of service vouchers and the introduction of personal 
care budgets.
The newest reform proposal, given to parliament in 2020, also includes 
a scheme for the regionalisation of municipal social, health, fire and rescue 
services through new regional governments. The proposal has many similar 
elements to the previously failed proposal, but this time the plans to expand 
the residents’ freedom of choice are excluded.
As Table 2 demonstrates, the central government has evaluated the 
impacts of the ageing population quite consistently by highlighting the 
growing demand for social and health care and increasing public expendi-
tures. The potentially increasing inequalities among citizens have distressed 
the cabinets, as they have considered uneven regional development as 
a probable and very serious threat to society, jeopardising the egalitarian 
distribution of basic welfare. A common feature of the proposed and imple-
mented reorganisation reforms has been a shared vision that the unification 
and consolidation of municipal services and structures is a solution, but the 
cabinets have had differences concerning the form, scope and scale of 
regionalisation and the powers of local residents as service customers.
Municipal mergers and development of inter-municipal 
collaboration
With Finland being the most sparsely populated country in the EU, the 
fundamental structural problem of local governments has been their small 
size (Bailey 1999). This long-term problem has been addressed by municipal 
mergers and inter-municipal collaboration. The mergers have been either 
voluntary or compulsory (i.e. top-down), for example, in the 1970s and again 
in 2014–2015, but this conceptual classification is somewhat rough or artifi-
cial. Namely, the central governments initially granted cost compensations 
and more recently special incentive grants to wheedle municipalities, at least 
formally, into voluntary mergers. The valid incentive grants are discretionary, 
in other words non-automatic, but some argue that state-funded subsidies 
are necessary because there is a need to consolidate municipal structures, 
especially because of the ageing population and the pressures of public 
finances. Table 3 demonstrates how the number of municipalities developed 
from 1972 to 2017.
According to empirical studies, municipal mergers have not delivered 
the expected savings on municipal spending. Vartiainen (2015) and 
Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2018) compared changes in the expenditures 
of merged municipalities and non-merged comparable municipalities and 
could find no evidence of cost savings with municipal mergers. 
Furthermore, Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015) demonstrated that mergers 
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generate considerable one-off extra expenditures since municipalities 
seem to hastily spend money between the amalgamation decision and 
the actual amalgamation.
As, practically, all municipalities have been too small to take care of 
the most demanding welfare duties, the legislature already made inter- 
municipal collaboration compulsory a long time ago, as so-called statu-
tory joint municipal authorities (sometimes called joint municipal boards) 
were introduced for the first time in 1948 to improve the economies of 
scale of special health care. Later on, the use of these bodies was also 
made compulsory in regional planning and development and in the care 
of disabled people. Besides compulsory joint municipal authorities, muni-
cipalities have established some voluntary joint municipal authorities 
especially around local public utilities. However, the system of inter- 
municipal organisations has proven to be fragmentary and asymmetric 
(Mäkinen and Niemivuo 2014; Anttiroiko and Valkama 2017). 
Nevertheless, Table 3 demonstrates that the system has also had some 
flexibility, as the number of the joint municipal authorities has scaled up 
and down during previous decades.
The Municipal and Service Structure Reform extended inter-municipal 
collaboration by introducing statutory catchment areas in social and basic 
health care, but it also opened up an avenue for more flexible methods 
of collaboration through contractual commitments without the creation 
of separate legal entities. A special host municipality contract model was 
legalised, which means an outsourcing arrangement between local 
authorities combined with a shared governance system through a joint 
political committee with a co-ordination function.
Table 3. Development of the number of municipalities, average population size of 
municipalities, voter turnout in municipal elections, share of urban municipalities, and 
number of joint municipal authorities between 1972 and 2017 (Statistics Finland 2020; 





tion size of 
municipalities
Voter turnout 
(%) in municipal 
elections
Share (%) of urban local 





1972 512 9, 089 75.6 10.2 321
1976 475 9, 960 78.5 13.3 384
1980 464 10, 318 78.1 18.1 403
1984 461 10, 616 74.0 18.2 381
1988 461 10, 747 70.5 20.4 422
1992 460 10, 989 70.9 20.4 286
1996 455 11, 280 61.3 22.4 250
2000 452 11, 463 55.9 23.7 231
2004 444 11, 794 58.6 25.0 217
2008 415 12, 834 61.2 27.2 164
2012 336 16, 151 58.3 32.1 130
2017 311 17, 727 58.8 34.4 118
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Effective fiscal equalisation of municipalities
We analysed the financial health of municipalities against municipal classes 
consisting of heavily aged municipalities, two medium classes regarding 
ageing and against the most favourable class of municipalities with a less- 
aged population. We used the financial health figures applied in Finland 
when assessing the financial health of municipalities: income tax rate (the 
main tax source of municipalities), accrued deficit or surplus and the debts of 
the municipal group. In these analyses, we used consolidated debts per 
inhabitant because municipalities have divided tasks differently between 
their own core organisation and municipally owned enterprises and other 
service producers. This combined (e.g. group) figure can be considered as 
a better indicator of local government solidity.
The average key financial figures do not differ greatly between the groups 
of municipalities. However, the accrued surplus per inhabitant is largest in the 
municipalities with the most aged people. It seems that, in this least favourable 
group, the equalising grant system added to the municipalities’ own financial 
management policies is able to effectively compensate for the cost difference.
Although it is mostly aged municipalities that have confronted the stron-
gest depopulation (Table 6) and highest social and health care expenditure 
per inhabitant (Table 5), their key financial ratios are not worse (Table 4) than 
those of other municipalities with more favourable conditions. This is an 
elementary finding in our study, its key reason being the strong equalisation 
effect of state grants on municipalities.
The equalising power of the grant system is illustrated in Table 7. 
Municipalities with the largest share of old people also have the highest 
grant and tax income per inhabitant.
The revenue equalisation system, which provides 80% of the average per 
capita calculatory tax revenues for all municipalities, supplements municipa-
lities’ block grants based on spending needs. Spending needs equalisation is 
financed by the central government, while tax revenue equalisation is 
financed partly by local governments. The basic services block grant uses 
the following criteria for social and health care and elementary school ser-
vices: sizes of variable age groups,1 unemployment and the morbidity rate of 
municipal inhabitants. Additional criteria are bilingual inhabitants, inhabi-
tants with foreign language, island municipality, population density and 
low educational background.
The block grants for factors other than basic education and culture are 
based on the following criteria: for secondary and vocational schools, the 
criteria include calculative cost €/student varying between institutions and 
study programmes; other cultural institutions (museums, theatres, orchestras, 
etc.) and youth and sports activities are based on €/inhabitant or €/hour of 
teaching or €/person labour year.
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Especially in the block grant for social and health care, the age group of old 
people carries a strong weight. The combined group consisting of the three 
oldest groups of people have a 39% weight, and the 85 or older group has 
a weight of 28% of the calculated municipal basic social and health care and 
related expenses of which the grant is a share that is the same for all 
municipalities. This explains the strong equalising effect favouring municipa-
lities with a disadvantageous age structure. The correlations give 
Table 4. Municipalities classified by the size of the old people’s group and some 
averages of financial variables of year 2019. (Source: Statistics Finland and the associa-
tion of Finnish regional and local authorities, elaborated by the authors).
Municipality Accrued Debts of









Share (%) 65 years 
and older:
31.12.2013 31.12.2018 % €/inhabitant €/inhabitant
34–43 (Group 1) 3,663 3,354 20.88 1 876 4 503
28–33 (Group 2) 7,311 6,908 21.03 1 204 5 113
21.8–27 (Group 3) 11,565 11,221 20.90 1 120 4 967
9-9–21.7 (Group 4) 48,447 50,893 20.24 1 190 5 286
Table 5. Municipalities classified by the size of the old people’s group and some 
averages of current costs per inhabitant of year 2019. (Source: Statistics Finland and 
















€ per inhabitant € per 
inhabitant
€ per inhabitant
56 34–43 7 344 4 816 938 1 538
82 28–33 6 620 4 123 712 1 393
96 21.8–27 6 168 3 616 565 1 316
60 9.9–21.7 5 482 3 002 380 1 170
Table 6. Municipalities classified by the size of the old people’s share and some averages 
of demographic variables of year 2019. (Source: Statistics Finland and the association of 








Percentage of people Municipalities 65 75 Ratio of non- 
working group
2014–2018
Share (%) 65 years 
and older
Number % % per working-aged 
group
%
34–43 56 36.9 16.8 90.8 −8.13
28–33 82 30.9 13.9 81.0 −6.01
21.8–27 96 27.8 12.2 76.2 −4.24
9.9–21.7 60 18.5 7.5 63.3 2.80
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concentrated information on the variation between grant income per inha-
bitant and other variables (Table 8).
The larger the share of old people (people 65 or older) and the higher the 
income tax burden (rate) in the municipality, the more grant income per 
inhabitant the municipality has. This overall picture of correlations supports 
our observation of the strong equalisation effect of the grant system in 
relation to the ageing phenomenon. The share of old people was also the 
strongest explanatory factor for grant money in a regression analysis with the 
same variables as the independent variables (not shown here).
The share of old people was also the strongest explanatory factor for the 
combined variable of tax and grant income per inhabitant (Table 9).2 The 
combined variable shows the main money source of municipalities (basic 
income) that is usable for social and health care and other obligatory tasks. 
With this regression analysis, we show that the age variable has a strong 
impact on the available main money resources per inhabitant in Finnish 
municipalities.
If the equalisation mechanism is efficient towards local governments, 
those municipalities with unfavourable circumstances and high spending 
needs caused by service provision will end up with a higher level of tax and 
grant money than those with favourable circumstances and relatively lower 
spending needs.
The results of the regression analysis show that the size or population 
density of the municipality does not explain the amount of tax and grant 
money per inhabitant. Furthermore, the income tax rate (variation range 
16.5–22.5%) and all other variables except the surplus variable explain less 
than the share of old people.
Inhabitants with a foreign language is a variable that has a negative 
coefficient. Immigrants live mainly in big cities. In the whole equalisation 
system (consisting of both tax equalisation and spending needs equalisation) 
they end up as either net payers or modest net receivers. The coefficient 
should not be negative when the other variables are controlled, if the size 
measured with inhabitants is included, and if the grant system compensates 
for the spending needs of people with foreign languages.
The Nordic model of the equalisation policy is an important institutional 
factor. Reducing differences between municipalities helps all municipalities 
to have quite the same possibilities to provide basic welfare services: munici-
palities with the highest ageing problems also have more basic income per 
inhabitant to cope with their heavy social and health care costs.
We also ran a regression analysis using the accrued surplus per inhabitant 
as a dependent variable. Table 10, which also includes multicollinearity tests 
with acceptable results, shows that the share of old people also explains (with 
a positive coefficient) the financial condition.
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Discussion and conclusion
Municipal finances have become increasingly unsustainable in recent dec-
ades in terms of both intergenerational equity and autonomous financial 
capacity. Municipal tax rates have risen and municipalities have run into 
debt while the share of 65 and over population has increased substantially. 
Although the municipal sector will receive some perceptible relief from the 
pension reform of 2017, which raises the retirement age and links it to life 
expectancy, it is widely believed that the fiscal stress of the municipalities will 
not only continue in general but also worsen in some particular 
municipalities.
Finnish national and local policymakers have responded to the pressures 
of municipalities by merging them, which has closed down the operations of 
many small and rural municipalities that are too small to survive alone in 
financial hardships. However, it is difficult to demonstrate methodologically 
how much the ageing population as such has contributed to local merging 
decisions, as many marginalised municipalities have also suffered a rapid 
decline of classic industries and outmigration.
Our findings also demonstrate that state-run policies of shared services 
have become more dominant as the obligatoriness of inter-municipal colla-
boration has increased. These findings parallel some other studies that have 
reported strengthened state control (Kröger 2011) and statutorily increased 
use of cooperative municipal services (Sjöblom 2020; Anttiroiko and Valkama 
2017). The Finnish municipal restructuring strategy has progressed in the 
opposite direction of the public choice preference associated with the advan-
tages of inter-municipal competition, as the municipal mergers have cut 
Table 9. Regression model (ordinary least squares) of the dependent variable of 
combined tax and grant income per inhabitant. Data for variables were collected from 




Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 2110.659 1126.474 1.874 .062
Percentage population change 
(2014–2018)
−12.198 11.461 −.070 −1.064 .288 .339 2.949
Accrued surplus per inhabitant .133 .029 .212 4.529 .000 .659 1.517
Debts per inhabitant .061 .023 .107 2.590 .010 .851 1.176
Income tax rate (%) 76.447 52.572 .078 1.454 .147 .507 1.971
Share of old people 82.596 8.063 .621 10.244 .000 .394 2.538
Share of inhabitants with foreign 
language
−47.145 16.476 −.143 −2.861 .005 .576 1.736
Population density .212 .183 .060 1.157 .248 .542 1.845
Number of observations: 294 
Dependent Variable: Combined tax and grant income per inhabitant 
Durbin–Watson 1.847 
Adjusted R Square 0.576
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down the number of municipalities, and municipal-municipal collaboration 
has woven local interests together. These developments are similar to other 
European countries which have had many small municipalities (Lowndes and 
Gardner 2016; Baldersheim and Rose 2010).
Interestingly, our study shows how the strong grant policy gives even 
poorer and ageing municipalities about the same financial starting points as 
others. We were able to identify that, although a large number of Finnish 
municipalities suffer one way or another from declining demographics, there 
are no remarkable differences in the financial ratios between the municipality 
groups. So far, the country has avoided the strong polarising effect observed, 
for example, in the United Kingdom (Gray and Barford 2018). Municipalities 
have increased their tax rates and collected more debt funding, but this has 
happened quite evenly in all municipalities. We are able to explain this by the 
state grant system, as it includes a strong equalisation of the tax base and 
spending needs between municipalities (Oulasvirta and Turala 2009).
The adaptive division of municipalities, scalable structures of inter- 
municipal organisations, flexible forms of shared services and the strongly 
equalising grant system have been effective and balancing policy instruments 
in the case of Finland. Together, these instruments have helped to avoid the 
phenomena of depopulation and ageing that cause radical polarisation in key 
financial health ratios. However, we must notice that even if financial health 
ratios are not distressingly polarised, the accessibility of health services has 
begun to differentiate regionally to a worrying degree (MDI 2020).
Our findings also suggest that the renewal of the municipal structures has 
been such a slow and modest process – including compulsory, state- 
Table 10. Accrued surplus per inhabitant in municipalities explained with a regression 
analysis (OLS). Data for variables collected from the 2019 municipal statistics of the 




Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Constant 13,919.550 2107.803 6.604 .000
Percentage population change 
(2014–2018)
−4.527 23.016 −.016 −.197 .844 .339 2.948
Debts per inhabitant −.069 .047 −.077 −1.480 .140 .857 1.167
Income tax rate (%) −673.012 97.821 −.429 −6.880 .000 .591 1.692
Share of old people 56.158 15.850 .265 3.543 .000 .411 2.431
Share of inhabitants with foreign 
language
−55.988 32.924 −.107 −1.701 .090 .582 1.719
Population density 1.668 .354 .295 4.710 .000 .584 1.713
Number of observations: 294 
Dependent Variable: Accrued surplus per inhabitant 
Adjusted R Square 0.327 
Durbin–Watson 2.015
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subsidised and fully voluntary mergers of municipalities and inter-municipal 
organisations – that the recent central governments have considered that 
more fast-acting and profound actions are necessary. National politicians 
acknowledge that the phenomena of the ageing population and demographic 
decline, especially due to a record low birth rate, are fundamentally changing 
society and are even somewhat existential threats to the welfare state model 
based on municipal funding and delivery of welfare services. All the recent 
central governments have identified the consequences of the ageing popula-
tion in very similar ways, but their implemented and proposed public policy 
responses have differed, thus far illustrating incompatibilities in the prefer-
ences between political parties and national, regional and local interests. Like 
the previous government, the current government also plans to replace public 
social, health, fire, and rescue services currently run by local governments and 
joint municipal authorities with regionalised service systems.
The proposed big-bang reform does not necessarily change the constitu-
tional position of local governments as democratic, multi-purpose and self- 
governing institutions with powers to levy taxes, but municipalities would 
have to somehow reinvent themselves as strongly streamlined local public 
authorities since the possible regionalisation would transfer a considerable 
part of municipal duties, revenues and expenditures to the new regional 
governments. The reform would radically change the classic character of 
the decentralised welfare state, and local authorities would need to recon-
ceptualise not only their welfarist but also their policy-making role within the 
new system of three democratic governmental tiers.
Notes
1. The age groups are: 0–5, 6, 7–12, 13–15, 16–18, 19–64, 65–74, 75–84, and 
85 years old and older people.
2. Number of inhabitants and share of children were removed from the model 
because of strong multicollinearity. The number of inhabitants correlated with 
the percentage change of the population and the share of children with the 
share of old people. Several different models were tried, and the share of old 
people had a positive significant coefficient in all of them.
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